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INCORPORATING EXPLICIT ETHICAL
REASONING INTO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
POLICIES
Benjamin E. Berkman*
INTRODUCTION
Since the emergence of the H5N1 highly-pathogenic (avian) influenza
threat in 2004,1 scholars and policy-makers have been actively preparing for
a potential pandemic. These five years represented an unprecedented
opportunity. Although historically, three to four global pandemics have
2occurred each century, never before had the world been given prospective
warning about such a potentially serious influenza outbreak. This early
warning meant that steps could be taken to prevent, or at least mitigate, the
health effects of this looming global public health emergency. 3  Social
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Georgetown University Law Center. The opinions expressed here are the author's and do
not reflect the policies and positions of the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Public
Health Service, or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This research
was supported in part by the Intramural Research Program of the National Human
Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health.
1. Highly pathogenic H5N1 animal infections were discovered in 1996, and the first
human cases were reported a year later, but the disease only emerged as a real threat after
a second wave of infections in 2004. See WHO, H5N1 Avian Influenza: A Timeline
(May 8, 2006), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/timeline.pdf.
2. Benjamin E. Berkman, Mitigating Pandemic Influenza: The Ethics of
Implementing a School Closure Policy, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & POL'Y 372, 373
(2008).
3. Id.; Margaret Chan, Director General, WHO, World Now at the Start of 2009
Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.who.int
/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h n lpandemic_phase6_20090611 /en/index.html).
The WHO pandemic levels do not reflect a measure of disease severity, but rather the
degree of transmissibility and extent of global spread. Phase six is the highest level,
indicating that there is human-to-human spread of the virus in multiple WHO regions.
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distancing strategies were devised and implemented, medical
countermeasures were developed and stockpiled, and careful thought was
given to buttressing critical infrastructure from the impending social
disruption.4 Beyond these medical, social, and public health preparedness
efforts, scholars and government officials also had an opportunity to grapple
prospectively with the ethical impact of preparedness and response
activities, with the goal of ensuring that the burdens of disease and benefits
of intervention would be distributed equitably.
5
See WHO, Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert, http://www.who.int/csr/disease
/avianinfluenza/phase/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
4. See, e.g., Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
(Nov. 2005), available at http://flu.gov/professional/federal/pandemic-influenza.pdf as a
comprehensive description of the readiness efforts; CDC, Community Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation (2007), available at http://www.flu.gov/professional!
community/commitigation.html; WHO, Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic
Influenza, International Measures, 12 EMERG. INFEC. Dis. 81 (2006); Dennis P. Andrulis
et al., Preparing Racially and Ethnically Diverse Communities for Public Health
Emergencies, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1269 (2007); Aaron Katz et al., Preparing for the
Unknown, Responding to the Known: Communities and Public Health Preparedness, 25
HEALTH AFF. 946 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health and Avian
Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, 78 YALE J. BIOL. AND MED. 235 (2005); Ethics
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee to the Director, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention - Ethical Guidelines in Pandemic Influenza (Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/phethics/panFlu EthicGuidelines.pdf, Nancy Berlinger
and Jacob Moses, Bioethics Backgrounder: Ethical Decisionmaking During An Influenza
Pandemic (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/pdf/Pandemic-
Backgrounder-The-Hastings-Center.pdf; Lori Uscher-Pines et al., Planning for an
Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and Disadvantaged Groups, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT, July-Aug. 2007, at 32; Lawrence 0. Gostin and Benjamin E. Berkman,
Isolation, Quarantine, Border Control and Social-Distancing Measures (2008), available
at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/cds flu ethics_5web.pdf; Ross Upshur,
The Role and Obligations of Health-Care Workers During an Outbreak of Pandemic
Influenza (2008), available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publicationslcds_
fluethics_5web.pdf, Robert Archer, Pandemic Influenza Planning and Response -
Transnational Issues for Governments (2008), available at http://www.who.int
/csr/resources/publications/cds flu ethics 5web.pdf; WHO, Ethical Considerations in
Developing a Public Health Response to Pandemic Influenza (2007), available at
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_CDSEPRGIP_2007_2c.pdf;
Committee on Modeling Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza, Modeling
Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza: A Letter Report (National Academy of
Science, 2006); Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most
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Unfortunately, these ethical preparedness efforts have been of limited
utility to-date. While numerous scholars have identified and explored a
range of important ethical issues, data indicate that ethical considerations are
not regularly incorporated into actual pandemic preparedness plans. 6 The
consequences of this failure have yet to be felt for H5N1, since the virus
remains only a potential threat. But with HINI influenza (swine origin)
rapidly emerging as a real global public health danger, the current situation
presents an interesting opportunity to assess how our public health system
reacts under pressure, allowing us to ask important questions about how, and
to what extent, policy-makers are incorporating ethical considerations into
7their deliberative processes.
As an example of a situation in which ethical considerations influence
policy-making processes, this essay will briefly explore issues surrounding
domestic and global H1N1 vaccine allocation decisions. Important policy
decisions that influence allocation, such as prioritization of a scarce HINI
vaccine, require careful balancing of multiple considerations. Decision
makers have to weigh epidemiologic and scientific evidence alongside
practical and ethical considerations. Policies developed without sufficient
ethical discourse run the risk of undermining public trust and cooperation by
contributing to a perceived lack of fairness and transparency. This is
Vulnerable in Emergencies, 42 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1491 (2009); University of Toronto
Joint Centre for Bioethics, Ethics and Pandemic Influenza White Paper Series (CanPrep
White Paper Series, 2009), available at http://www.canprep.ca/CanPREPWP Series.pdf
[hereinafter White Paper Series].
6. See, e.g., James C. Thomas et al., Ethics in a Pandemic: A Survey of the State
Pandemic Influenza Plans, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S26 (2007); Lori Uscher-Pines et al.,
Priority Setting for Pandemic Influenza: An Analysis of National Preparedness Plans, 3
PLoS MED. 1721 (2006).
7. Given that historically the globe experiences three to four major pandemics each
century, it should not be surprising that a new pandemic is at hand. The 20th century, for
example, witnessed the Spanish flu (1918, HINI, 20 to 50 million deaths), Asian flu
(1957, H2N2, I to 2 million deaths), Hong Kong flu (1968, H3N2, 1 million deaths), and
Swine flu (1976, HINI, no pandemic). Jeffery K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens,
1918 Influenza: The Mother ofAll Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15
(2006); Lone Simonsen et al., Pandemic Influenza and Mortality: Past Evidence and
Projections for the Future, in THE THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ARE WE READY? 99
(Stacey Knobler et al. eds., National Academies Press 2005); Richard Krause, The Swine
Flu Episode and the Fog of Epidemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 40, 40-41
(2006); Taubenberger et al., The Next Influenza Pandemic: Can It Be Predicted?, 297 J.
AMA 2025 (2007).
2009
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVI: 1
particularly true when making potentially controversial decisions about how
to allocate a demonstrably scarce resource.
Given that the emerging pandemic is still in its early phases, with rapidly
shifting surveillance data and assumptions, the goal of this essay is to ask a
preliminary set of questions about incorporation of bioethical reasoning into
H1N1 policy decisions. After first summarizing current information about
the epidemiologic characteristics of the disease and projected vaccine
availability, I will focus on two recent U.S. vaccine allocation policies: the
domestic allocation recommendations promulgated by the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and President Obama's
decision to share ten percent of the country's vaccine supply with
developing countries. I will demonstrate that while both of these policies are
reasonable and appropriate, they could have been better supported by the
inclusion of more explicit ethical reasoning. The failure to do so raises
serious questions about the fundamental ethical underpinnings of our
political actions.
THE CURRENT Hi Ni INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
On June 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the
HINI threat had become a full pandemic, raising the alert level from phase
five to six.8 Globally, as of the end of September 2009, there have been
more than 300,000 laboratory-confirmed cases of the virus with almost
4,000 deaths.9 These numbers likely represent a substantial underestimation
of total cases in the world as many countries focus surveillance and
laboratory testing only on persons with severe illness. In the U.S., for
example, it is estimated that there have been at least one million cumulative
infections.' 0 U.S. officials have stopped reporting cumulative data, but
8. Margaret Chan, Director General, WHO, World Now at the Start of 2009
Influenza Pandemic (June 11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h 1 n I _pandemic_phase6_20090611 /enlindex.html).
As previously explained, the WHO pandemic levels do not reflect a measure of disease
severity, but rather the degree of transmissibility and extent of global spread. Phase six is
the highest level, indicating that there is human-to-human spread of the virus in multiple
WHO regions. See WHO, Current WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert, available at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/phase/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2009).
9. WHO, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Update 67, available at http://www.who.int
/csr/don/2009_09 25/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
10. CDC, Update: Influenza Activity-United States, April-August 2009, MMWR,
Sept. 10, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm58e0910.pdf
[hereinafter CDC MMWR].
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surveillance data shows that visits to doctors for influenza-like illness are
significantly higher than what would normally be expected during this time
of year and have been increasing as summer draws to a close and the fall flu
season ensues. 11  Multiple states began reporting widespread influenza
activity at the end of summer, which is highly unusual for this time of year.
12
The epidemiologic characteristics of an influenza outbreak can change
quickly, making it difficult to predict morbidity and mortality. Currently,
WHO is estimating a high secondary attack rate, which suggests widespread
morbidity. 13 At present, it appears as if HINI mortality is similar to that of
seasonal influenza, but the possibility that the disease could mutate into a
more virulent strain cannot be eliminated.
14
In the United States, these assumptions relating to mortality rate and
likelihood of mutation translate into predictions of infection in thirty to fifty
percent of the U.S. population in the next six months. 15 This could result in
up to 1.8 million hospital admissions, which would put a significant strain
on intensive care units, which already operate at or near capacity.
16
Moreover, assuming average mortality rates, there could be as many as
90,000 U.S. deaths. 17  This mortality would presumably be concentrated
among children and young adults, as the majority of cases have been
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Secondary attack rate is the risk of new cases arising from contact with an
infected person. Typically, seasonal influenza has a five to fifteen percent secondary
attack rate, while the H1N1 outbreak is showing a rate in the twenty-two to thirty-three
percent range. See WHO, Assessing the Severity of an Influenza Pandemic (May 11,
2009), available at http://www.who.int/ csr/disease/swineflu/assess/disease swineflu_
assess 2009051 1/en/index.html.
14. Id.
15. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-HINI INFLUENZA (Aug. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PCASTH IN 1 Report.pdf.
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id. But see, Donald G. McNeil, Agency Urges Caution on Estimates of Swine
Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at A12 (arguing that the estimate of 90,000 deaths is too
high and the actual number of deaths will likely be lower).
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observed in people under the age of eighteen,' 8 and the rate of
hospitalization has been highest in children under the age of four.1 9 Elevated
risk has been observed for infected individuals with certain pre-existing
conditions, such as diabetes, hypertension, and respiratory impairment.
z
21Pregnant women also appear to be at higher risk. Individuals over the age
of sixty-four seem to be at lower risk of getting infected, but remain at
22
elevated risk for complications.
It should be noted that there are approximately 30,000 to 40,000 annual
U.S. deaths typically associated with seasonal flu, the majority of whichS 23
occur in people over sixty-five. The HINI morbidity and mortality
distributions seem to skew much younger (possibly leading to many more
life-years lost). 4 The absolute number of projected deaths, however, does
not appear to be as extreme as was feared at the beginning of the outbreak,
25
when a much higher case fatality rate was observed. Nevertheless, it is
possible that current assumptions about disease characteristics will turn out
to be incorrect.26 In 1918, the pandemic initially appeared to be mild, only
later emerging as a threat that claimed more than fifty million lives, in a
18. Fatimah S. Dawood et al., Emergence of a Novel Swine-origin Influenza A
(H1N1) Virus in Humans, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2605, 2611 (2009). These findings are
based on a sample size of 642 patients. As the authors of this article note, clinical
recommendations will evolve as additional epidemiologic data is collected.
19. CDC MMWR, 2009 HINI Flu: Situation Update (October 30, 2009), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/H 1nlflu/update.htm.
20. National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Use of Influenza A
(HIN1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccine. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2009 MMWR, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmL/rr5810al .htm?s cid=rr5810a l_e [hereinafter NCIRD].
21. Id.
22. CDC MMWR, supra note 10.
23. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 15, at 2.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at vii.
26. Id.
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much less densely populated and easily travelled globe.27 It is important to
continue preparing using current data, but with the knowledge that the threat
could intensify.
HINI VACCINE AVAILABILITY
A key response to an influenza pandemic is a highly matched, widely-
available vaccine. 28 Initially, there was serious concern about the timing,
availability, and efficacy of an HINI vaccine. With current technology, it
typically takes approximately six months (if not longer) from the onset of an
outbreak for the first doses of vaccine to become available. 29 Given that
HINI was discovered in April, September/October was the earliest
projected date for vaccine distribution, a point in time at which infections
would already have begun to increase. There were also concerns about
insufficient production capacity. 30 Vaccine supply has been unreliable even
for seasonal influenza.3 1 The U.S. only has a few producers, and as I will
discuss below, there are severe global shortages as well. Furthermore, there
was little data on the extent to which medical countermeasures would be
efficacious. 32  Until recently, it was thought that two doses would be
required, which would have effectively halved availability. 33 Plus, influenza
has historically and universally demonstrated the ability to mutate, which
raised concerns about a vaccine based on the current strain only providing
partial protection against a mutated strain.
27. Taubenberger et al., supra note 7.
28. See generally, Lawrence 0. Gostin and Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic
Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public's Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (2007).
29. WHO, Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline, Aug.
6, 2009, available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/hlnl vaccine-
20090806/en/index.html.
30. See Gostin and Berkman, supra note 28, at 128.
31. Id.
32. Feng-Cai Zhu, et al., A Novel Influenza A (HINI) Vaccine in Various Age
Groups, NEJM (online: 10.1056/nejmoa0908535) (October 21, 2009).
33. Jennifer C. Doreen, Guidance on HIN1 Vaccine Dosage, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
2009, at D2.
2009
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Fortunately, vaccine production has proceeded smoothly. Studies show
that the vaccine is more efficacious than previously thought. Only one dose
is required, effectively ensuring that initial availability calculations will not
need to be halved.34 Furthermore, vaccine doses became available a few
weeks earlier than projected, in the first two weeks of October.35 This
heartening news does not, however, obviate the allocation problem. Vaccine
is still going to be delivered gradually at first, which very likely will create a
perpetual supply shortage through the middle part of the flu season.3 6 The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that only 3.4
million doses will be available initially.37 Eventually, manufacturers should
be able to ship up to twenty million doses per week, but it is unclear how
long this production run-up will take.
38
For purposes of discussion, this article assumes that supply of vaccine will
exceed demand, at least for the initial stages of the pandemic. This is an
appropriate assumption for a number of reasons. First, even if the twenty
million dose per week delivery level was reached in mid-October, it would
take months before there would be sufficient supply to vaccinate the 159
million Americans identified as being at elevated risk. 39 The number of
infections could begin to spike in October or November, meaning that many
high risk individuals might not receive vaccine in time. Second, delivery of
vaccine does not equal actual administration; logistical challenges will slow
down distribution, further limiting early availability. Distribution
infrastructure will be spread thin by current plans calling for vaccination of
more than half of the U.S. population with HINI vaccine, while
concurrently running the regular seasonal influenza vaccination programs.
Finally, there is a possibility that non-prioritized people will siphon off
available supply, further exacerbating potential vaccine scarcity. Individual
34. Id.
35. Tom Randall and Jason Gale, Swine Flu Shots to Start in Three Weeks as U.S.
Cases Spread, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601124&sid=asY1Po7lOFqw.
36. Andrew Pollack and Donald McNeil, A Nation Battling Flu, and Short Vaccine
Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 2009, at Al.
37. Maggie Fox, First U.S. H1N1 vaccine will be nasal spray: CDC, REUTERS, Sept.
18, 2009.
38. Id.
39. See Pollack and McNeil, supra note 36, at Al.
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providers will be responsible for administering most of the vaccine, but they
are not bound by the guidelines discussed below, and likely will feel
pressured to give vaccine to the worried as well (in this case, vaccine seekers
who are not at elevated risk of infection or complication).
PRINCIPLES OF VACCINE ALLOCATION
During a non-pandemic period, allocation of scarce vaccine is generally
guided by the goal of reducing morbidity and mortality for those most at
risk. But during a pandemic involving a new influenza strain, there is a
potential that everyone is at risk, so competing considerations arise.
Significant literature has been written on the ethical issues associated with
scarce vaccine allocation,40 and it is not the intention of this article to
propose a new framework. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly reviewing some
of the most prominent arguments.
Given the assumed scarcity, a number of different criteria can be used to
determine how best to allocate HINI vaccine. One approach involves a
utilitarian focus on maximizing total public health benefit. Obviously, there
is a strong imperative to use available resources to save as many lives as
possible. This argument, however, can take a number of forms, including
prevention, vulnerability, and minimizing mortality. Prevention involves
allocating vaccine in such a way as to minimize the spread of infections.
This would include strategies such as ring vaccination around an infected
region, or vaccinating school children, who have been shown to be a primary
driver of seasonal influenza transmission. Allocation based on vulnerability
would prioritize individuals based on their risk of getting infected.
Minimizing mortality would allocate vaccine to those people most likely to
die if infected. Many people have also proposed related utility arguments,
such as protecting critical infrastructure/social functioning by prioritizing
professions (medical personnel, first-responders, utility workers, etc.) that
40. See, e.g., Richard K. Zimmerman, Rationing of Influenza Vaccine During a
Pandemic: Ethical Analyses, 25 VACCINE 2019, 2019 (2007); Mark A. Miller et al.,
Prioritization of Influenza Pandemic Vaccination to Minimize Years of Life Lost, 198 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 305, 305 (2008); Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Alan Wertheimer, Who
Should Get Influenza Vaccine When Not All Can?, 312 SCIENCE 854, 854 (2006);
Matthew K. Wynia, Ethics and Public Health Emergencies: Rationing Vaccines, 6 AM. J.
BIOETHics 4, 4 (2006); John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza
Pandemic: Why It Won't Be Easy, 78 YALE J. BIOL. AND MED. 283, 283 (2005); Marcel
Verweij, Equitable Access to Therapeutic and Prophylactic Measures, 5-28 (WHO,
Discussion Papers, Chapter 1, 2008) available at http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/cds flu ethics_5web.pdf.
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are necessary to keep society running, thus providing indirect health and
safety benefits to the population.4 '
A second approach incorporates principles of equity and justice. Rather
than focusing on saving the most lives, this perspective is concerned with
ensuring that benefits and burdens are appropriately distributed, particularly
when resources are scarce. This cluster of arguments is associated with
minimizing discrimination and unfairness, and can lead to prioritization of
those who are worst off.42 Some of these arguments have garnered wide
support. For example, some have argued that reciprocal fairness dictates
allocation of vaccines to healthcare workers when their jobs expose them to
increased risk of infection. More controversially, some have called for a fair
innings approach, prioritizing younger persons who have not had a chance to
live through a range of life stages.43 Others have called for a focus on
existing disparities, such as baseline health status or access to healthcare
services.44
DOMESTIC HIN I VACCINE ALLOCATION
With these ethical frameworks in mind, the kinds of arguments articulated
in the course of the U.S. vaccine allocation deliberations can be analyzed.
ACIP, for example, provides guidance on the use of vaccines and related
agents.45 This expert committee reports to the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) and CDC. In the ACIP charter, the committee is
charged with a number of responsibilities, including an obligation to give
advice on "population groups and/or circumstances in which a vaccine or
41. See, e.g., Verweij, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Emanuel and Wertheimer, supra note 40.
44. As I will discuss below, a number of scholars and advocates have approached the
allocation issue from a global perspective, arguing that distributive justice requires a
more equitable distribution of worldwide vaccine resources.
45. CDC, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - Charter, (April 2008)
available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downloads/charter-apri108-march-
201 0.pdf.
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related agent is recommended. ' '4 6 ACIP met in late July, 2009, to discuss
47the allocation of H IN I vaccine.
The committee articulated a number of considerations that they felt were
relevant to making a vaccine allocation decision, including: the severity of
an individual's illness and risk for complications, frequency of illness,
contribution to the overall burden of severe illness, protection of healthcare
system functions, reduction of societal impact, and potential for indirect
protection of more vulnerable contacts. 48 Based on these consideration, and
assuming full vaccine availability, the committee determined that the
following groups should have priority access to vaccination: pregnant
women, household contacts and caregivers for children younger than six
months of age, healthcare and emergency medical services personnel,
persons six months through twenty-four years of age, and only those persons
aged twenty-five through sixty-four years who have medical conditions
associated with a higher risk of influenza complications, including chronic
pulmonary, cardiovascular, renal, hepatic, cognitive, neurologic/neuro-
• • 49
muscular, hematological or metabolic disorders, and immunosuppresson.
Recognizing the potential supply problems discussed above, ACIP
suggested the potential need for further prioritization. In the event of a
vaccine shortage, ACIP recommended that vaccine be given to a more
precisely-targeted high priority group, including pregnant women, household
contacts of infants under six months of age, healthcare professionals and
emergency responders who would have direct contact with patients or
infectious materials, children aged six months through four years, and
children aged five to eighteen years old with chronic medical conditions.
5 0
46. Id.
47. CDC, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - Agenda
(July 29, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downloads/agenda-
jul09.pdf. Unfortunately, detailed minutes of their deliberations have yet to be released.
The committee has ninety days to make these publicly available, and as of this writing,
they had not yet been published. This analysis is based on currently available summary
information. As such, this is only a preliminary discussion; further analysis is required
once complete information is available.
48. See supra note 20; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices - Influenza Vaccine Workgroup Considerations
(July 29, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downloads/mtg-
slides-ju109-flu/Il -Flu-Fiore.pdf.
49. See supra note 20.
50. Id.
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INCORPORATING ETHICAL REASONING INTO THE ACIP GUIDELINES
These guidelines have been relatively non-controversial, but questions
remain about the extent to which they adequately incorporate a range of
ethical considerations. Scholars have proposed a number of frameworks for
evaluating the incorporation of ethics into pandemic preparedness policies,
and vaccine allocation in particular. Of particular relevance is a
framework developed by a panel of public health officials, ethicists, and
clinicians who were convened by the Hastings Center and the Providence
Center for Health Care Ethics. 52 This expert panel identified a number of
ways in which pandemic plans might not adequately incorporate ethics.
First, plans may articulate priority lists without justifying or explaining why
those groups should be given preferential access to a scarce resource.
Second, plans may fail to acknowledge equity concerns, such as existing
disparities (e.g., income, health status, or access to healthcare). Third, plans
may fail to differentiate between public health ethics and clinical ethics.
While more detailed analysis is required in subsequent scholarship, this
framework can be instructive as an initial way of measuring the extent to
which the ACIP guidelines have carefully considered a range of ethical
issues.
53
The ACIP guidelines appear to do a reasonably good job of delineating a
set of priority populations and justifying this decision. The guidelines
clearly explain that the priority groups are based on an underlying principle
of minimizing the burden of illness.54  One can further separate the
committee's articulated goals into two categories, each of which is supported
by sound justification and robust epidemiologic data. The first group of
goals is aimed at directly minimizing morbidity and mortality; prioritization
groups are selected on the basis of severity of illness, risk for complications,
frequency of illness, and contribution to the overall burden of severe
illness.55 Based on the most recent epidemiologic data, this means that the
vaccine should first go to people at high risk for infection and/or
51. See e.g., Kass, supra note 5; Berlinger and Moses, supra note 5; Uscher-Pines,
supra note 5; White Paper Series, supra note 5.
52. Berlinger and Moses, supra note 5.
53. See Chan, supra note 3, at 2.
54. NCIRD, supra note 20.
55. Id.
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complications (i.e., pregnant women, adults with certain pre-existing
conditions, children under five years of age).56 The second group of goals is
aimed at preventing ancillary harm by preserving social functioning through
protecting healthcare system functions, reducing societal impact, and
indirectly protecting vulnerable populations. 57 This set of goals translates to
the prioritization of people who can help others (i.e., caregivers of young
children and healthcare personnel).
While the choice of priority groups is well justified, corresponding
attention does not seem to have been paid to the second prong of the
Hastings analysis. A close examination of the relevant published documents
reveals no evidence of discussion about non-disease minimizing concerns,
such as equity, non-discrimination, and pre-existing disparities. To
demonstrate this point, I conducted an informal content analysis of the
guidelines, building on earlier research regarding the incorporation of ethics
into H5N1 preparedness plans. In a 2007 study, researchers conducted an
analysis of all existing federal and state influenza pandemic plans to
ascertain the frequency of a defined set of ethically relevant terms. 8 Their
analysis revealed a notable absence of ethical language, leading the
researchers to criticize the plans for failing to "[a]rticulate the underlying
ethical values or principles that would enable states to rethink or refine the
priorities." 59 Adapting their methodology, I searched both the published
MMWR article detailing the official ACIP recommendations, as well as the
final recommendation document presented at the July 29, 2009, ACIP
meeting, finding no instance of any ethical term as a result of this search.
While content analysis cannot demonstrate whether particular discourse
actually occurred, the presence or absence of certain words can serve as a
proxy for direct evidence of ethical reasoning. In this case, the complete
absence of relevant language provides strong support for the claim that there
was little discussion of non-disease minimizing concerns.
The recommendations also fail to adequately address the third prong,
concerning the distinction between clinical and public health ethics. The
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Thomas et al., supra note 6. This list included terms such as accountability,
autonomy, collaboration, competence, confidentiality, consent, disparity, diversity, duty,
egalitarian, ethic, equality, fair, harm, inclusive, just, liberty, moral, obligation,
participation, privacy, representation, responsive, responsibility, right, transparent, trust,
and utilitarian.
59. Id. at S29.
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former involves a focus on what is best for the individual patient, while the
latter considers what is best for the whole community. These two
perspectives can often conflict, and the most appropriate vaccine allocation
guidance will address this potential tension by giving clinicians relevant
decision-making tools. Notably, however, the guidelines include no
discussion of prioritization within the target groups. If an individual
clinician is faced with a vaccine shortage, and has multiple high priority
patients, no guidance is given regarding which of the prioritized populationsh ivn n' 60
should be given preferential access. Failure to articulate a detailed ranking
of priority groups places clinicians in a situation where they are forced to
make their own fair allocation decisions that potentially could be at odds
with what is best from a public health perspective. How should the clinician
with one dose at hand decide whether to vaccinate the fifty-year old
emergency room doctor or the three-year old child with a chronic pulmonary
condition?
These critiques should not be read as a complete rejection of the ACIP
guidelines. The guidelines effectively identify priority groups that, if
targeted first, will minimize the overall impact of the H1N1 outbreak. This
kind of prioritization certainly represents an important and relevant form of
ethical reasoning. At the time these guidelines were published, however, it
was still unclear when and how much vaccine would be available; early
shortages were certainly possible. In this context, additional ethical
considerations should have been discussed and publicly articulated. The
lack of explicit discussion of ethical issues masked the hard allocation
choices associated with scarce vaccine supply. Criteria designed to produce
the greatest benefit are an appropriate starting point for allocation decisions,
but they become inadequate when there is insufficient supply to protect the
entire population of prioritized indicated patients (159 million).
As discussed above, there are a range of values (equity, justice, non-
discrimination, etc.) that are also important. These considerations take on
particularly increased relevance in situations of severe shortages. If
everyone at elevated risk cannot be protected, careful thought must be given
to procedures for allocating vaccine in an equitable and non-discriminatory
manner. Given the controversial and subjective nature of these ethical
considerations, and the resulting winners and losers, it might be impossible
for an entity such as ACIP to stake a formal position. The absolute omission
of any reference to these concepts, however, does the public a disservice.
Real discourse about concepts like equity, justice, and non-discrimination
should have been included in the articulated guidance for a number of
important reasons. Such discussion, for example, can serve as a tool for
clinicians and public health officials faced with real world allocation
60. Id.
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decisions. Discussion of these ethical considerations can serve as a cue to
encourage public engagement about distribution and allocation priority
setting under situations of product scarcity. Inclusion of a broader range of
ethical considerations can also bolster public trust and can avoid a perceived
lack of fairness, particularly under the social pressures created by an active
pandemic outbreak.
GLOBAL H1N1 VACCINE ALLOCATION
Beyond domestic vaccine allocation decisions, it is also important to
analyze the U.S. role in global vaccine allocation. While the U.S. likely will
have sufficient vaccine supply eventually, global availability of H1N1
vaccines remains uncertain. Based on initial WHO assumptions in May
2009, a maximum of approximately five billion doses could potentially be
produced in twelve months, but only if several assumptions are met.
61
While the vaccine manufacturing process appears to have gone reasonably
well, the WHO recently down-graded their total global vaccine production
estimate to three billion doses in the next twelve months.
62
Even if this supply estimate is achieved, distribution is extremely
concentrated. Influenza vaccine production is concentrated in a handful of
countries. Specifically, eighty-five percent of the world's supply of
influenza vaccine is produced by companies located in eight industrialized
countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the
United States, Canada, and Australia.63  Only thirty-five percent of all
seasonal doses reach developing countries and there are serious concerns
about the distribution of HINI vaccine. 64 While manufacturers are taking
some positive steps, such as expressing a willingness to implement tiered
pricing and committing to donation of 150 million doses, most of the
61. WHO, Pandemic Influenza Vaccine: Current Status, Sept. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/pandemic-influenza-vaccines-20090924/
en/index.html.
62. Id.
63. Gostin and Berkman, supra note 28, at 129. In a pandemic with a higher case
fatality rate, it is possible that governments will nationalize the vaccine industry, refusing
to export any of their nationally produced vaccines until domestic demand is satisfied.
However, given the moderate nature of this pandemic, this concern can be set aside.
64. Id.
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vaccine currently being produced has already been purchased by developed
nations.
65
Given this reality, a number of scholars and advocates have articulated
strong arguments in favor of a more equitable distribution of vaccine.
66
Their arguments can be divided into two rough categories. Some have
argued that distributive justice requires a more equitable global distribution
of HINI vaccine, based on the principle that all lives have equal value.
These arguments focus on the fact that national wealth, rather than need, has
become the predominant allocation criteria. Accordingly, "rich countries
have a responsibility to stand in line and receive their vaccine allotments
alongside poor countries, even if they have paid for their vaccine before
others could do so." 67 International organizations argue that the world's
poorest nations will bear a disproportionate burden of suffering from the
disease. Mortality rates will be higher because of inadequate healthcare
systems and existing co-morbidities, and the resulting social disruption
could harm the fragile economies and infrastructures of these countries,
leading to further health impacts.
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Another set of arguments focus on self-interest and national security as
justification for distributing vaccine more widely. These arguments are
predicated on the fear that concentrated vaccine distribution will leave whole
regions unprotected, resulting in the rampant spread of the pandemic.
Unfettered transmission of the disease could cause it to mutate, becoming
much more virulent and possibly rendering existing medical
countermeasures ineffective. This mutated strain could then pose a direct
threat to formerly vaccine-protected countries. As an official from WHO
noted, "there needs to be a recognition that the whole world is affected by
this pandemic and the chain is only as strong as its weakest link."69
65. Tadataka Yamada, Poverty, Wealth, and Access to Pandemic Influenza Vaccine,
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1129 (2009).
66. See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 65; Lawrence 0. Gostin, Global Goal for Vaccine
Quest, THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN OBSERVER, Aug. 8, 2009, at 12; Noni MacDonald,
H1NI Influenza Vaccine: Global Access for a Global Problem, 181 CANADIAN MED.
ASSN. J. 123 (2009); Ruth A. Karron & Ruth R. Faden, A Moral Obligation: Should the
U.S. Produce Enough HINI Flu Vaccine to Help Developing Countries?, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 17, 2009; White Paper Series, supra note 5.
67. Yamada, supra note 65.
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THE OBSERVER, Sept. 20, 2009, at 5.
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The United States recently announced that it would donate ten percent of
its vaccine supply to needy countries, in concert with other developed
countries and the WHO. 70  While this may be viewed as an admirable
decision, it is important to examine the articulated reasoning behind this
policy. 71 Are we sharing vaccine out of a moral obligation to the world's
most vulnerable, or are we simply doing what is in the country's best
interest?
While it is impossible to know what reasons were articulated during the
closed decision-making process, the official announcement of the decision is
illuminating. In this memo, the White House declares that "diseases know
no borders and that the health of the American people is inseparable from
the health of people around the world." 72 The announcement goes on to cite
limiting the spread of disease, and reducin 3the risk of a more virulent strain
emerging, as key reasons for this decision. Interestingly, it is stressed that
this decision will not impact the availability of vaccine in the United States,
particularly since onl.4 one dose will be required and supply will be on hand
earlier than expected.
The United State's decision to share vaccine is an equity promoting action
that commendably demonstrates a willingness to cooperate as part of a
global community. Rather than frame the decision in terms of global
distributive justice, however, the official announcement focuses on a
national security rationale for sharing vaccine. Overall, the tone is inward
looking, stressing the benefits to Americans (and the minimized costs).
75
This is in contrast to the more cosmopolitan justice perspective voiced by a
number of scholars cited above. But does this matter? It would be
70. David Brown, U.S. to Donate 10 Percent of Swine Flu Vaccine to WHO, WASH.
POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at Al.
71. PRESS RELEASE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES PLAN TO
EXPAND FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL HINI PANDEMIC (Sept. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/President-Announces-Plan-to-Expand-
Fight-Against-Global-H INI-Pandemic/.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The announcement also mentions saving lives as a broad goal of this policy, but
this single mention is outweighed by the overwhelming self-interest rhetoric.
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reasonable to argue that the reasoning behind a policy is less important than
the nature and effect of that policy. It would also be defensible to explain
the lack of explicit ethical reasoning as resulting from practical and political
considerations. From a statist perspective, government has a responsibility
to its citizens first and foremost, and arguments to that effect will carry the
most weight. Particularly from a partisan political perspective, democratic
strategists must worry about arguments that this policy represents a lack of
commitment to protecting the American public. Such attacks can more
easily be deflected if the policy is based on a self-interest rationale.
Even though these political and practical concerns are legitimate, I would
argue that a failure to include an explicit ethical justification for sharing
vaccine globally sends an unfortunate message-the United States only
shares resources when it is convenient and advances our national interests.
This was an opportunity to set a more idealistic standard. There will be
future pandemics, and a more nuanced ethical justification for sharing
vaccine under current conditions could have created a precedent for the next
big public health threat, when it might be harder for individual countries to
justify sharing their limited resources with less fortunate nations.
Furthermore, explicitly incorporating the concept of global justice into this
decision-making process would have demonstrated that such ethical
reasoning can be a valid basis for making policy, potentially broadening the
fundamental underpinnings that can be used to support subsequent political
actions and policy decisions.
CONCLUSION
Responding to an influenza pandemic requires the careful balancing of
practical, ethical, and political considerations, in an environment
characterized by uncertain and constantly shifting epidemiologic and
scientific evidence. The past five years have been spent anticipating this
kind of situation, and the goal of this analysis was to demonstrate that
despite this preparation, when faced with a manifest public health threat, our
ethical response was lacking. This is not to say that the policies discussed
above were inappropriate; both the ACIP guidance and the decision to share
vaccine globally are fundamentally sound from both a scientific and
utilitarian perspective. Nevertheless, they represent a lost opportunity to
articulate more nuanced ethical reasoning that explicitly utilizes the principle
of equity as the basis for a policy decision. Saving the most lives is an
appropriate ultimate goal for pandemic response, but it is important to base
policy decisions on more than just utilitarian and scientific arguments.
Arriving at the right outcome is only part of the equation; decisions must be
supported by a set of principled rationales that can be generalized to
subsequent situations. History demonstrates that the world will regularly be
faced with pandemics, some of which will have the potential to cause
widespread morbidity and mortality. Systematically incorporating ethical
2009 Pandemic Influenza Policies
reasoning into policy-making processes will help to ensure that the benefits
and burdens of future pandemics are equitably distributed.
